Many important decisions are routinely made by transient and temporary teams, which perform their duty and disperse. Team members often continue making similar decisions as individuals. We study how the experience of team decision-making affects subsequent individual decisions in two seminal probability and reasoning tasks, the Monty Hall problem and the Wason selection task. Both tasks are hard and involve a general rule, thus allowing for knowledge transfers, and can be embedded in the context of markets that offer identical incentives to teams and individuals. Our results show that teams trade closer to the rational level, learn the solution faster, and achieve this with weaker, less specific, performance feedback than individuals. Most importantly, we observe significant knowledge transfers from team decision-making to subsequent individual performances that take place up to five weeks later, indicating that exposure to team decision-making has strong positive spillovers on the quality of individual decisions.
Markets As A Learning Tool
lists a number of economic forces that might allow markets to cancel out individual biases and noise. Among these factors is the provision of clear and unambiguous incentives, the ability of biased traders to infer information from less biased traders through feedback (Budescu & Maciejovsky, 2005) , and the disproportionate impact of a small number of unbiased traders (with enough access to capital) to impact prices. Learning is facilitated through observing bids, asks, and trades that all convey information about the underlying assets (Bloomfield, Libby, & Nelson, 1996; Meloso, Copic, & Bossaerts, 2009 ).
Since markets are characterized by a set of rigid rules, designed to standardize interactions and communications among participants (Maciejovsky & Budescu, 2012) , they offer a potential learning tool allowing participants to infer the solution to problems with unique solutions. Participants can, for instance, re-assess their solutions and valuations by taking into account the number and magnitude of bids or asks that have been submitted for specific solutions, make inferences based on trading prices for different solutions, or consider payoff feedback received between market periods, etc. We now introduce the two intellective tasks used in our studies.
The Monty Hall Problem
We use a variant of the problem that involves playing cards (following Friedman, 1998, and Kluger and Wyatt, 2004) . We showed participants three stylized playing cards (marked with the suits clubs, diamonds, and hearts). We also endowed participants with one card (randomly selected from the three). All participants were given the same suit. For exposition purposes, assume that the heart suit was picked. Participants were then shown the three cards, face down, in random order (labeled 1 to 3). A number (1 to 3) was randomly determined and the corresponding card was set aside (still face down).
Participants were told that, since they held a heart card, they would receive £1 if the set-aside card were a heart card and £0 otherwise. However, they also had the option of switching from the original card (heart) to one of the other cards after one of the two remaining cards was revealed. Note that the revealed card was always a losing card, i.e.,
given the endowment of a heart card in our example, the losing card must have been either a club or a diamond card. For exposition, assume that a diamond card was revealed.
After the card revelation, participants had to decide whether they wanted to switch (from a heart card to a club card 1 ). They were promised £1 if the set-aside card matched the one they had. If they decided not to switch, then they would earn £1 if the set-aside card was a heart card, and if they switched to a club card, then they would get £1 if the set-aside card was a club card.
Since it was common knowledge that the revealed card was always a losing card, switching was the optimal solution for a utility maximizing decision maker. By switching, one increases the chance of winning from 1/3 (the probability of being endowed with the correct card initially) to 2/3. This is the case, since the two cards, which were not set aside have a combined probability of 2/3 of containing the winning card. However, since one of these two cards is always revealed, the probability of the winning card -when switching -is 2/3 (but remains at 1/3 when not converting).
Typically, switching rates for individuals are fairly low (around 30%, Friedman, 1998) . The generally low switching rates have been attributed mostly to people's tendency to assign equal probabilities to all possible outcomes in a set (Fox & Levav, 2004) and to statusquo bias (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988) . Slembeck & Tyran (2004) showed that groups switch more often than individuals, particularly when they compete against other groups. Yet, Slembeck & Tyran (2004) did not examine any transfer of knowledge from groups to subsequent individual decision-making.
The Wason Selection Task
The task was originally designed to test whether individuals employ the rules of formal logic, when testing conditional statements of the form "if p, then q" (Wason, 1966) . In the standard problem, individuals are shown four cards. The cards have a letter on one side and a number on the other side. The participants' task is to verify the conditional rule "if there is a vowel (the p-card) on one side, then there is an even number (the q-card) on the other side" by identifying the minimal set of cards that must be flipped to fully test whether the rule is true or false. The cards shown are: E (p), K (not-p), 2 (q), and 7 (not-q). Formal logic analysis requires checking (a) the truthful implication of the rule by flipping the card E (p) and (b) the potential falsification of the rule by flipping the card 7 (not-q).
Typically, only around 10% to 20% of the participants solve the problem correctly (Griggs & Cox, 1983) . Around one-third of the participants select only card E (p) and about one-half of the participants select the incorrect combination of cards E (p) and 2 (q) (see Evans & Over, 2004 , for a review). These findings have been replicated in numerous studies (Evans & Over, 1996) with recent evidence suggesting that the task is not only popular, but also a suitable tool for measuring actual reasoning ability (Evans & Ball, 2010) .
STUDY 1: ARE TEAMS MORE STRATEGIC THAN INDIVIDUALS AND IS EXPOSURE TO TEAM DECISION-MAKING BENEFICIAL FOR LONG-TERM
KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER?
Participants
One hundred twenty students (40% male) from Imperial College London, aged 18 to 31 years (M=21.68, SD=2.58), participated in the study. Sessions lasted about 110 minutes and participants earned, on average, £22.48 ($35.54, SDs = £4.80 / $7.59).
Experimental Design and Procedure
We contrasted learning, and subsequent knowledge transfer, in 10 markets consisting of four individual traders each (n=40), and 10 markets with four two-person teams (n=80) each. We refer to the two conditions as INDIVIDUAL and TEAM, respectively.
In Stage I, all participants were asked to solve the Monty Hall problem individually (see problem 1 in The markets were computerized (implemented with the software z-Tree, Fischbacher, 2007) and were based on the study by Kluger and Wyatt (2004) . Trading only started when participants had solved correctly all the items of a short quiz, designed to check understanding of the instructions. Markets consisted of 10 trading periods. At the beginning of each period, participants were shown three cards (clubs, diamonds, hearts). These cards were shown face down on the computer screen, shuffled, and one card was randomly selected to be the setaside card. Participants were endowed with three cards of one type (clubs, diamonds or hearts). The same procedure was applied to all markets and periods, but the cards selected varied across periods.
Participants/teams were endowed with 300 Experimental Currency Units (ECUs) at the beginning of each period (with an exchange rate of 100 ECU = £1) and 3 cards of a given suit. Participants then traded their cards in a continuous double auction for 90 seconds.
amounted to the sum of their cash holdings in the two auctions and the total number of cards held at the end of each of the two auctions. Finally, participants had the option to convert all, none, or some of their cards. They were promised 100 ECU for each card held (either through trading or conversion) that matched the set-aside card. Finally, all cards were revealed, participants received feedback about their payoffs in that period and the next period started.
At the conclusion of the market, one period was chosen at random and participants received the payoff from that period (i.e., cash holdings plus card earnings). Payments were received after Stage III.
In Stage III, participants were shown seven new Monty Hall problems with three to five cards each (see Table A1 of the supplementary appendix), allowing us to test for potential knowledge transfers. One of these problems was chosen at random and formed the basis of the participants' payoffs for this stage. Participants received payments for Stages I-
III.
Stage IV took place five weeks after the experiment was completed. We emailed to all the participants the same questionnaire (seven Monty Hall problems) used in Stage III and asked them to e-mail us their decisions. Over 80% of the participants responded. Again, one of the seven problems was chosen at random to determine participants' payoffs. Payments could be collected in person from the lead author. Figure 2 shows the percentage of conversion rates across periods. Clearly, the teams start out more strategically than individuals by converting a higher proportion of their card holdings early on. This can be inferred from the near 50% conversion rate in the first period (see Figure 2) Transfer analysis across stages: We averaged the individual conversion rates across Stages III and IV for each distinct class of card problems (3-, 4-, and 5-card problems; see This finding suggests that team decision-making is particularly effective for new problems, as 4-and 5-card problems of the task were not used in the initial market experiment.
Results

Discussion
Study 1 demonstrates that teams outperform individuals and that this advantage is preserved even five weeks after the original interaction took place. Importantly, the pricing of the cards suggests that the advantage of teams was evident even before trading took place.
Teams priced cards closer to the optimal level from the very first period, suggesting that teams analyzed and solved the problem more efficiently than individuals. In the second study, we investigate how teams improve their problem-solving skills by using a pure logic problem (rather than a problem of Bayesian updating, as in Study 1). This allows us to check the robustness of the results obtained in Study 1 for different problems and to observe more directly how the advantage of team decision-making materializes. For this purpose, we use the Wason selection task. In Study 2, we videotape the teams' discussions in an effort to shed more detailed light on the underlying decision processes than was possible in Study 1.
STUDY 2: DO TEAMS LEARN FASTER THAN INDIVIDUALS AND ARE THEY MORE SUCCESSFUL IN TRANSFERING KNOWLEDGE?
Study 2a
Participants
One hundred twenty undergraduate students (42.5% male) from the University of Jena, aged 19 to 36 years (M=23.24, SD=2.92), participated in the study. The recruitment of the participants was done with ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) . Sessions lasted about 120 minutes and participants earned, on average, €8.06 ($10.88, SDs = €3.67 / $4.95).
Experimental Design and Procedure
In Stage I, participants were asked to solve one Wason selection task individually (see first problem of Table A2 in the supplementary appendix). Correct choices were rewarded with €4 ($5.40), but feedback and payments were delayed to the end of the experimental session.
In Stage II, 40 participants were randomly assigned to groups of four in the INDIVIDUAL condition and 80 participants to groups of eight in the TEAM condition. In the latter, participants were then randomly split into four two-person teams, and were given time to discuss the problem prior to market opening.
Participants were told that each card has a color on one side and a geometric figure on the other side. Participants were instructed to test the rule "If the card is red (p) on one side, then there is a triangle (q) on the other side" (see Table A2 ). The four cards shown in the instructions were: red (p), black (not-p), triangle (q), and rectangle (not-q). For the remainder of the article, we refer to the p card as Card I, the not-p card as Card II, the q card as Card III, and the not-q card as Card IV. This implies flipping cards I and IV is the correct solution.
We used a continuous combinatorial auction, allowing participants to submit buying offers (bids) for each of the 15 possible card combinations (see Figure At the beginning of each period, participants were endowed with 500 ECU which were equivalent to €5 ($6.75 at the time of the study). A total of 16 cards (four Cards I, four Cards II, four Cards III, and four Cards IV) were auctioned in each period. During each period, participants could submit bids for any card combination, as long as they had enough cash holdings. All bidders could see the other participants' bids, after they have been submitted. At the end of each period, the winners of the auction were determined by a computer program implementing an algorithm designed to maximize the auctioneer's (experimenter's) revenue (i.e., the bids before paying dividends). The algorithm used an exhaustive enumeration of card partitions (for a discussion of a similar problem see Sandholm, 2002 , or Pekeč & Rothkopf, 2003 .
After each period, participants (teams or individuals) were awarded dividends of 200 ECU (= €2) per correct pair of cards (I and IV), regardless of which other cards they held.
Teams' payoffs were doubled and split equally between the two members. Dividends were paid out at the end of the experiment and, hence, could not be used to increase one's cash endowment of subsequent periods. Participants were not allowed to convert their ECU holdings (that were not used for bidding) to actual cash at the end of the experiment. This restriction was designed to induce participants to acquire cards, rather than saving up their cash holdings. We did not allow participants to buy cards on credit. Payoff feedback about dividend earnings was provided privately to individual participants and teams after each period.
We expect that learning in the auction is due to the participants' ability to track their own behavior and the behavior of the other participants (easily identified by unique labels, A, B, C, and D). The other bidders' bids are informative of their valuation of different (sets of)
cards, from which a bidder might infer what is most likely the correct card combination. Own behavior is important for learning since payoff feedback between periods allows inferring -in an optimal case -the correct solution, and in other cases, whether a particular bundle of cards is more or less likely to be the right card combination.
In Stage III, participants were asked to solve eight Wason problems individually (for a complete listing see Table A2 ). The location of the solution cards was varied across the problems (meaning that in some problems the solution was to flip cards I and IV, in others to flip cards II and IV, I and III, etc.). This task tests for general knowledge transfers, because participants need to fully understand the solution of the problem to consistently identify the correct card combinations.
At the conclusion of a session, participants were paid their combined earnings from 
Results
Stage I: The average rate of correct solutions was 20.0%. The solution rates of subjects who were subsequently assigned to the INDIVIDUAL and TEAM conditions were 22.5% and 18.75%, and did not differ significantly.
Stage II:
We computed the proportion of bids on the correct solution out of the total amount of submitted bids for each individual/team in each auction period. Bids on the correct solution were defined as bids for the combination of Cards I and IV, as well as bids for those two individual cards, when placed at the same time and for the same number of cards. Note that our definition is conservative and represents a lower bound of the target quantity.
Although participants received dividends for card combinations that included redundant cards in addition to the solution (e.g., I, II, and IV), our definition requires participants to identify the solution cards precisely.
Since bidding in the auction is a function of all the bidders in a group, the unit of statistical analysis is the auction rather than the individual bidder or team. The proportion of bids on the correct solution was aggregated across the four individuals/teams in each auction. Figure 3 shows the proportion of bids that was placed on the correct solution as a function of experimental condition and period. We observe a monotonic increase of bids on the correct solution across auctions for both individuals and teams, suggesting that participants learn the correct solution.
We averaged the bids across auction blocks of 5 periods (block 1: periods 1-5, block 2: periods 6-10,..., block 6: periods 26-30) and subjected them to a 2-way mixed ANOVA with the between-subjects factor decision unit (INDIVIDUAL vs. TEAM) and the withinsubjects factor auction block (1 -6 
Discussion
Study 2a demonstrates that in the context of combinatorial auctions considerable learning takes place and it is transferred successfully to post-auction behavior. Confirming our main hypothesis, we found that teams learned the solution to the Wason selection task faster than individuals, but members of teams were not necessarily more successful in transferring their knowledge to a set of new reasoning problems in Stage III. Figure 3 suggests that this might be due to the length of bidding: The learning advantage of teams over individuals, evinced by the proportion of bids on the correct cards, diminishes across the 30 auction periods. This means that at the beginning of Stage III subjects both from the INDIVIDUAL and the TEAM condition achieve similar levels of learning. As a consequence, we do not observe differences in the overall transfer of knowledge (across all sessions).
To test this explanation, we investigate next whether teams are superior to individuals in terms of transferring their knowledge to new problems when the learning phase is much shorter -10 auctions, instead of 30.
Study 2b
Participants
One hundred twenty undergraduate students (45% male) from the University of Jena, aged 18 to 34 years (M=22.56, SD=2.82), participated in the study. None of them had participated in Study 2a. Recruitment was done with ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) . Sessions lasted about 95 minutes and participants earned, on average, €6.75 ($9.11, SDs=€3.17 / $4.28).
Experimental Design and Procedure
Study 2b is an exact replication of Study 2a with two changes: We reduced the number of auction periods from 30 to 10, and we determined payoffs for Stage II by randomly selecting only one of the 10 periods.
Results
Stage I: The average rate of correct solutions was 28.3%. The solution rates of subjects who were subsequently assigned to the INDIVIDUAL and TEAM conditions were 27.5% and 28.75%, and did not differ significantly.
Stage II: Figure 4 shows the proportion of bids on the correct solution across periods as a function of experimental condition. We analyzed the proportion of bids on the correct solution in a 2-way mixed ANOVA with the between-subjects factor decision unit (INDIVIDUAL vs. TEAM) and the within-subjects factor auction block (periods 1-5 vs.
periods 6-10 
Discussion
Study 2b replicates all the results of Study 2a regarding the superior learning of teams, and demonstrates that individuals who bid as part of teams were more successful in transferring their acquired knowledge to a set of new Wason problems than the individual bidders when the learning period was relatively short.
STUDY 3: CAN TEAMS LEARN WITH LESS SPECIFIC FEEDBACK THAN INDIVIDUALS?
In Study 3 we expose our previous findings to an important stress test. We examine whether teams can achieve similar results with weaker and less specific performance feedback and whether knowledge transfer is still better under such less favorable conditions. This stress test would lend higher credibility and broader relevance to our claims by showing that the beneficial knowledge transfer from teams to subsequent individual decisions is not restricted to specific information and feedback conditions (such as those used in studies 2a and 2b). Therefore, we use a different market mechanism -a continuous double auction -in which learning is more difficult than in the combinatorial auctions. We also manipulate the quality of earnings' feedback. The distinctive characteristics of the double auction markets that make learning more difficult are: -The market is "thin" (only four traders per auction), which leads to noisy trading prices.
Individual traders cannot be identified and imitated. Only aggregate (and anonymous) market behavior is observed.
The traders' motivation is ambiguous since this mechanism provides an incentive to acquire incorrect cards, as long as traders believe that other participants may wish to buy these cards later at a premium.
Cards are traded individually. Since the solution requires traders to hold two cards to receive dividends, they expose themselves to execution risk (holding one card by itself is worthless without having the other).
Based on our previous findings, we hypothesize that teams would achieve higher levels of learning and would be more successful at transferring their knowledge than individuals, despite the noisy market mechanism. 
Participants
Experimental Design and Procedure
We contrasted learning, and subsequent knowledge transfers, in a 2 by 2 betweensubjects design. The two factors were the decision unit (INDIVIDUAL vs. TEAM) and the performance feedback (strong vs. weak). We ran 10 markets in each of the four cells, with n=40 participants in each of the two individual conditions, and 40 dyads (n=80) in each of the two team conditions.
In Stage I, participants were asked to solve the Wason selection task (first problem of Table A2 ) individually. Correct choices were rewarded with £2 ($2.98), but feedback and payoffs were delayed to the end of the experimental session.
In Stage II, participants were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions of trading in computerized double auctions (implemented with the software z-Tree, Table   A2 ) in continuous anonymous double auctions (see Figure A2 in the appendix for a schematic screenshot of the auction). Each market consisted of four traders (who were, depending on the condition, individuals or two-person teams).
Fischbacher, 2007). Each market consisted of 12 trading periods during which participants could buy or sell the four cards of another Wason selection task (second problem in
7
At the beginning of each period, participants were endowed with 120 ECU (exchange rate: 100 ECU = £10) and with four cards of the same type (i.e., Card I or Card II or Card III or Card IV). To induce trading, only one trader (individual participant or dyad) in each market was endowed with a given card. The card assignment was determined randomly in each period. Trading periods lasted for 180 seconds. Participants could submit bids and asks; they could also accept standing offers (bids and asks) by other market participants. Only improving offers, i.e., higher bids and lower asks, were allowed. Participants were shown lists of concluded contracts for each card (in chronological order) and were informed about the remaining trading time and the current period number. Participants were not granted any credit and were not allowed to sell cards short, i.e., they were only allowed to make bids up to their cash holdings and submit asks for cards they actually owned. 7 In the TEAM condition, communication between team members was verbal. Team members sat next to each other in front of their PC terminal and discussed their strategy and actions before and during the auction periods. Participants were instructed to keep their voices low in order not to reveal their trading strategies to the other participants. Teams were given the same amount of time as individuals. So, teams needed to be quick and were potentially exposed to more time pressure than individuals -something that would make the superior performance of teams even more remarkable.
If participants held the correct cards at the end of an auction period, they received dividends of 80 ECU (= £8) for each complete set of solution cards. We varied the quality of the performance feedback that participants received at the end of each trading period (see Figure A3 of the supplementary appendix for a schematic screenshot of the information provided). Participants in the strong-performance feedback condition were informed about the dividends associated with each of the four cards separately. In this condition it was made explicit that cards II and III earned no dividends, and that cards I and IV would earn 40 each if held in pairs (see Figure A3a) . In contrast, participants in the weak-performance feedback condition were only shown the aggregate amount of dividends, without a direct link to the individual card holdings (see Figure A3b) , so in most cases a trader could not directly infer which card(s) paid dividends. At the end of the experimental session one period was randomly selected and participants obtained their cash holdings and dividend payments for that particular period.
In Stage III, participants were asked to solve eight new Wason problems (identical to Study 2a and 2b) individually. One of the eight problems was randomly selected and participants received £2, if they solved it correctly, on top of their earnings from Stages I and II. If participants' total earnings fell short of £4 ($5.96), they received this amount.
Results
Stage I: The average solution rate was 7.9%. There was no significant difference between subjects who were later assigned to the INDIVIDUAL (8.8%) and TEAM condition (7.5%).
Stage II: Figure 5 shows the average trading prices for the four cards across periods as a function of decision unit and feedback. Prices for correct (incorrect) cards were generally higher (lower) for TEAM (INDIVIDUAL) traders and with strong (weak) performance feedback. To confirm these impressions we aggregated the trading prices across periods for each of the four cards as a function of experimental condition and the 10 markets. We then computed the average trading price for the correct cards and subtracted the average trading price for the incorrect cards. This measure was subjected to a 2-way ANOVA with the between-subjects factors decision unit (INDIVIDUAL vs. TEAM) We also computed for each individual the fraction of correct choices across the eight transfer problems and subjected this measure to a 2-way ANOVA with the between-subjects factors decision unit (INDIVIDUAL vs. TEAM) and performance feedback (strong vs. weak).
We found a significant main effect for decision unit (F(1, 236) 
Discussion
Study 3 shows that teams were able to learn the correct solution to the Wason selection problem better than individuals even in competitive markets with less specific feedback. In particular, it is noteworthy that the panels pertaining to the cards that make up the correct solution in Figure 5 show that the trading prices of teams with weak feedback are indistinguishable from the prices of individuals with strong feedback. This implies that team decision-making can compensate for worse feedback. Like in Study 2b, members of teams were also more successful in transferring their acquired knowledge to new problems in Stage III of our Study 3. This shows that the result from Study 2b is not dependent on the type of feedback given.
SYNOPSIS: WHAT ACCOUNTS FOR THE SUPERIOR LEARNING IN TEAMS AND THE BETTER TRANSFER TO INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS?
Do Teams Start Off with Superior Information?
In Study 1, we controlled for the strength of the available information by ensuring that exactly one participant in each market knew the correct solution. However, for the two other studies, one possibility for the superior performance of teams might have been that they started off with better information compared to the individuals. While in total there were more subjects in the TEAM condition (50) who solved the problem correctly in Stage I than in the INDIVIDUAL condition (27), in the aggregate the level of information (i.e., the total number of correct pre-market solutions across all the players -4 or 8 -in a given market) is not superior in the larger markets (TEAM) (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: D=0.20, Z(D)=0.89, p>.05), so we reject this account.
Truth Wins and Team Performance
Another explanation of our findings would be that teams perform at the level of their best members. According to such a "truth wins" norm, a knowledgeable minority of group members can convince the majority by demonstrating the correct solution (Laughlin, 1980) . This effect would shift the level of learning and knowledge transfers upward in teams (relative to individuals). To test this explanation we compared the proportion of bids on the correct solutions of the best individual in each market (aggregated across all periods in Studies 2a and 2b) and the average team in each market (aggregated across periods). We did not find statistically significant differences between these distributions in Studies 2a and 2b, suggesting that the average team performs as well as the best individual, but not better. =.14), but no interaction effect. Table   1 shows the mean differences between bids for cards IV and III. teams do better than individuals and strong feedback is more effective than weak feedback.
8 All our prior analyses suggest that the crucial indication of identifying the correct solution in the Wason selection task hinges on the insight that Card IV is essential to test it, while the incorrect Card III seems the initially most likely candidate for a majority of subjects. For instance, in Stage I, 47% of the participants picked Card I and III, whereas only 7.9% picked Card I and IV.
These results provide evidence that teams can perform better than the best individual traders! A reasonable explanation is that, as part of their interaction, team members challenge each other's solutions, thereby inducing deeper, and more critical, levels of thinking and analysis, which help in identifying the correct solution (Moshman & Geil, 1998 
A Content-Analysis of the Team Interactions
We analyzed the video transcripts of the 40 teams of Study 2a. 9 We classified the participants' strategies, as inferred from their verbal interactions, into 8 distinct classes 10 . Table 2 summarizes our content analysis. The categories are listed in the order of their prevalence and broken by the stage of the experiment. Clearly, most of the interactions took place in the first third (periods 0-10) of the study, and their frequency declined from that point on. This observation is consistent with the finding that, on average, performance stabilizes and plateaus at that stage. Table 2 shows two distinct patterns. On the one hand, teams tried to infer the correct solution by imitating the behavior of others (strategy 1), which accounted for over 29% of all verbalized strategies. On the other hand, a substantial number of teams (44%) engaged in more strategic attempts to infer the correct solution. These teams put themselves in the position of their opponents (strategy 2), tried to infer the solution from the bids that were submitted for the various card combinations (strategy 3), and tried to strategically eliminate incorrect card combinations by varying their bids across periods (strategy 4).
There is also some, but much less, evidence for the demonstrability of the correct solution (strategy 5), and seeking to discuss confirmatory (strategy 6) rather than disconfirming evidence (strategy 7). In some teams group consensus was found by allowing individual members to alternate between their preferred solutions (strategy 8).
Of course, this data is only available for the teams. We cannot rule out the possibility that individuals consider similar strategies. However, even if they do, evidently they cannot implement them as efficiently and successfully as the teams. We speculate that the dyads'
advantage is due to their ability to share, test, validate and help implement these strategies 9 We do not have video transcripts of studies 2b and 3. This fact precludes the possibility that the better performance of teams and better learning transfer in teams might have been driven by a potential effect of being videotaped (being videotaped might have induced more engagement in the task to "show off" the team's smartness). Given that the basic insights from studies 2a, 2b, and 3 are the same, we can rule out that videotaping in study 2a had any noticeable effect on performance. 10 We performed a reliability check of the classifications by double-rating 10% of the videotapes. The inter-rater agreement between two independent raters (who were unaware of the study goals) was 94%, corresponding to κ = 0.88 with a 95% CI from 0.71 to 1.00.
with their partners!
The results from the transcripts suggest that imitating the strategies of others (strategy 1) and discovering the optimal solution by within-group conversation (strategies 2 -6) were the main drivers of learning for the teams. In the next section we build upon this observation when we compare team learning with individual learning.
The Relative Impact of Past Own vs. Other Behavior in the Auctions
For studies 2a and 2b, we calculated the fraction of bids that were placed on the correct solutions (SOL) for each individual/team in each period t. We regressed SOL in period t on (a) SOL of the same person/team in period t-1 and (b) the average SOL of the other individuals/teams on the same market in period t-1.
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The results show that past performance of the other players is always a better predictor of both individual and team performance than past own behavior, which demonstrates that there is learning from the behavior of others in the market. More relevant for our purposes, the effect of past own behavior is more pronounced for teams than for individuals. The OLS regression (R 2 = 0.47) for individuals is SOL(t) = 0.04 -0.02 SOL(own t-1) + 0.92 SOL(others t-1). The OLS regression for teams (R 2 = 0.33) is SOL(t) = 0.09 -0.07 SOL(own t-1) + 0.78 SOL(others t-1). The performance of the other players is a significant predictor in both regressions, whereas one's own performance is only significant for the teams, which suggests that teams depend relatively less on learning from others or, put differently, rely more on their own past performance through the processes listed in Table 2 . 
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We have studied the impact of team decision-making on market behavior and on subsequent individual performance for two seminal intellective tasks, the Monty Hall problem and the Wason selection task. While there has been considerable research comparing the nature and quality of the decisions made by individuals and teams (see, e.g., Bornstein, Kugler & Ziegelmeyer, 2004; Bornstein, Kugler, Budescu & Selten, 2008; Bornstein & Yaniv, 1998; Cooper and Kagel, 2005; Feri, Irlenbusch & Sutter, 2010; Kocher and Sutter, 2005) , there has been no work on the effects of being on a team in competitive environments on subsequent individual decisions.
Ours is the first paper to study systematically the net advantage of minimal (n=2) teams over individuals during and after participation in competitive markets. Remarkably, our results show that under identical competitive incentives, teams lead to considerably superior learning compared to individual traders and we infer that the learning from teams involved in competitive markets is superior to learning from cooperative teams in non-competitive settings (Maciejovsky & Budescu, 2007) . Moreover, we find that teams of traders price the assets closer to the rational level, and they learn the correct solution faster than individuals, and achieve this with less specific performance feedback. Teams can even beat a very high threshold -the truth-wins norm -possibly because they analyze more carefully the more complex problems.
The main contribution of our paper is in documenting the knowledge transfer from team decision-making to subsequent individual tasks, something that is of general relevance for all organizations, which need to decide whether the workplace organization is more teamoriented or more individualistic. We found a tremendous difference in the individual postmarket behavior between people who traded individually and those who traded as part of a team: People who traded as members of a team outperformed those who traded individually.
This effect was even observed five weeks after the original interaction took place (Study 1).
The net "team effect" (i.e., the advantage of a team member over an individual trader) was significant in Studies 2b and 3, where the opportunities for learning were shorter and feedback was less precise. In these two studies combined the transfer rate was 27% for participants who traded individually, and about 48% for those who traded in dyads. The identification of knowledge spillovers from team decision-making to subsequent individual behavior -and the associated enhanced problem solving skills -have important managerial implications. It supports the use of teams in organizational tasks not only as a means to achieve better decisions, but also as an important and relatively cheap training tool to improve the skills of employees in individual tasks. Moreover, our specific focus on the analysis of trading behavior in competitive auctions and markets suggests that even for financial and investment decisions, which have traditionally been motivated by individual Note: In case of two or more card choices, when converting, then the cards were chosen at random. 
